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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 




PENNSYLVANIA NATIONAL MUTUAL CASUALTY INSURANCE GROUP 
          
v. 
  
NEW ENGLAND REINSURANCE CORPORATION; HARTFORD FIRE 
INSURANCE COMPANY; 
 
EVEREST REINSURANCE COMPANY 
(Intervenor in District Court) 
 
Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Group, 
Appellant in No. 20-1635 
Everest Reinsurance Company, 




On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-18-mc-00278) 
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a): 
December 11, 2020 
_______________ 
 
Before: MCKEE, PORTER, and FISHER, 
Circuit Judges. 
 









PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company (“Penn National”) 
filed an arbitration award with the District Court under seal. Everest Reinsurance 
Company seeks to unseal that award pursuant to the common-law right of access. The 
District Court ordered the award unsealed because the award constituted a judicial record 
to which the common-law right of access applied, and Penn National did not articulate a 
clear and serious injury that would result from the unsealing of the award. We will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court. 
I 
Penn National entered arbitration with two of its reinsurance companies over a 
contractual dispute. The issue in the arbitration was whether Penn National was entitled 
to proceeds based on insurance claims it made to the reinsurers. The arbitration panel 
issued an award to Penn National. Penn National petitioned the District Court to confirm 
the award in order to reduce the award to a judgment, as required by federal law. See 9 
U.S.C. § 9. As part of the confirmation process, Penn National filed the award with the 
District Court. 9 U.S.C. § 13. One day after Penn National filed the award, the District 
Court granted Penn National’s request to seal it. Before the reinsurers responded to Penn 
 





National’s petition to confirm, the parties settled, and Penn National sent a letter to the 
District Court withdrawing its petition to confirm. Thus, the District Court took no action 
on the petition to confirm. 
Afterwards, Everest, another one of Penn National’s reinsurers not subject to the 
arbitration proceeding, moved to intervene and unseal the award. Everest sought to unseal 
the award under the common-law right of access. The District Court denied Everest’s 
motion after using the “Pansy factors”—used to determine whether to modify a 
confidentiality order issued under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). We reversed the 
District Court’s order and instructed it to apply the common-law-right-of-access analysis 
to determine whether to unseal the award. Pennsylvania Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. New 
England Reinsurance Corp., 794 F. App’x 213, 215–16 (3d Cir. Dec. 6, 2019). On 
remand, the District Court applied the common-law-right-of-access analysis and granted 
Everest’s motion to unseal the award, but stayed its order pending appeal. 
II1 
“[A] common law right of access attaches ‘to judicial proceedings and records.’” 
In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prod. Liab. Litig., 924 F.3d 662, 672 (3d Cir. 2019) 
(quoting In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 2001)). The common-law right 
of access permits members of the public to access documents in a judicial proceeding. Id. 
To determine if the common-law right of access applies to a document, a court must first 
 
1 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction to determine whether to unseal the 
award under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See N. Jersey Media Grp. Inc. v. United States, 836 F.3d 





determine if the document is a “judicial record.” Id. If the document is a judicial record, a 
court must presume the common-law right of access attaches. Id. A party opposing access 
to the judicial record can overcome the presumption by articulating a “clearly defined and 
serious injury” that would result from the disclosure of the document. Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Miller v. Ind. Hosp., 16 F.3d 549, 551 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
The court must then determine if the harm from the articulated injury outweighs the 
presumption of access. See id.  
We review a district court’s conclusion of law de novo. Avandia, 924 F.3d at 674 
n.8. We review a district court’s decision on whether to unseal a document under the 
common-law right of access for abuse of discretion. Id. 
A 
Penn National first argues that the arbitration award is not a judicial record to 
which the common-law right of access applies. Subject to several exceptions mentioned 
below, “the filing of a document gives rise to a presumptive right of public access,” thus 
making the document a judicial record. Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 
782 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied 
Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 161–62 (3d Cir. 1993)).  
Penn National claims that a different test applies for determining when a document 
becomes a judicial record. Penn National points to North Jersey Media Group, Inc., 836 
F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 2016), where we quoted language from Pansy and stated, “[T]he issue 
of whether a document is a judicial record should turn on the use the court has made of it 




original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pansy, 23 F.3d at 783). Use of this 
language in North Jersey Media was dictum: the plaintiffs in that case sought discovery 
materials, a category of judicial filings that “are generally not ‘judicial records’ and do 
not fall within the common law right of access.” Id. 
Furthermore, the quoted language from Pansy does not reference our test. That 
language references the test used by the First Circuit. Under this test, the common-law 
right of access depended on the “use” made of the document rather than whether the 
document “found its way into the clerk’s file.” Pansy, 23 F.3d at 783 (explaining test 
from FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1987)). We rejected this 
test. See id. Thus, if the document does make its way into the clerk’s file, then the 
common-law right of access ordinarily attaches. See id. Finally, in another portion of the 
Pansy opinion, we discussed the more functional “use” test for settlement agreements. 
See id. at 781. Settlement agreements, like discovery materials, are a category of 
documents “ordinarily inaccessible to the public,” and we do not read Pansy’s 
recognition of a “use” test for anything else but settlement agreements. Leucadia, Inc., 
998 F.2d at 164. 
Penn National filed the arbitration award on the docket with the District Court as 
part of its motion to confirm the award. Thus, according to our precedents, the award 
became a judicial record subject to the common-law right of access. 
B 
Penn National next argues that the District Court erred in holding that it did not 




demonstrate a “clearly defined and serious injury” sufficient to overcome the 
presumption of access, Penn National submitted an affidavit in which one of its officers 
asserted that other reinsurers might choose to forego paying Penn National and contest 
their contractual obligation to pay if they learned of the contents in the arbitration award. 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in asserting that no “clearly defined” injury 
existed as stated in the affidavit because it could not “determine how many possible 
relationships could be impacted, the amount of money that could be at stake, the types of 
actions other parties may pursue, or the likelihood that any such actions would be 
successful.” App. 15.2 
* * * 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
2 Everest filed a cross appeal seeking to reverse the District Court’s order staying its 
order to unseal the award pending appeal. That appeal is moot since we have affirmed the 
District Court’s judgment to unseal the award. 
